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Perspectives for Open Labour: A Politics of Radical Pessimism 
Paul Thompson and F. H. Pitts 
9th March 2017 
This document is submitted as part of a constructive engagement with the Management Committee’s Draft 
Position Paper (DPP). There is not much that most on the left could disagree with in the Statement. That 
has its merits, and we are sympathetic to not trying to have a position and policy on everything. 
In one sense this is an opportune time to be launching an organisation. Corbynism is under intense scrutiny 
and failing to connect with a majority of the UK public, and the centre right has little new to say. But it is not 
enough to identify a (soft left) political space. That space has to be filled with something that is distinctive 
and credible enough to win significant support. Below we set out the territories that traditionally offer points 
of differentiation: principles, positions, policies, practice and perspectives. Our contribution focuses on 
perspectives. There are two reasons for this. The first is pragmatic. What has brought us together as 
collaborators is some shared understandings about the direction of travel of both capitalism and the left- 
beyond that we wouldn’t know how much we’d agree on some positions and policies. The second reason 
is that perspectives are a good place to start as they are framing devices and should underpin strategy or 
at least strategic discussions. Without perspectives, it will be a struggle to survive, let alone grow, in what 
will be a highly divisive and challenging few years. 
The DPP focuses mainly on principles and positions. We take principles to refer to basic core values. In 
the document they appear to be almost wholly applied to organisational issues such as transparency, 
pluralism and, democracy. These are important and no doubt reflect the origins of Open Labour, but to have 
differentiating force, they have to be linked to more concrete issues. 
This brings us to positions, which we take to be differentiating claims or choices. The DPP has a section 
defined as Political Positions 2017-18. Here, the positions combine anti-austerity, a new social 
contract/bargain based on an alternative to neo-liberalism, and a social alliance that connects the new 
urban progressives with the old(er) left behind workers. There’s some sensible stuff about how Labour 
should go about arguing and organising for these positions, but very little engagement with more 
troublesome issues that the Party’s existing anti-austerity message under Miliband and Corbyn has utterly 
failed, or how a new social alliance can be forged when the component parts appear to be moving politically 
in different directions. 
The meat, in terms of differentiation anyway, of the DPP can be found in the two policy statements against 
hard Brexit and against a (formal) Progressive Alliance. We take policies to be concrete measures to effect 
change (such as the currently fashionable basic income). The DPP gives three themes on this front: For 
working people, against hard Brexit; against the progressive alliance; and a mass, democratic and plural 
party: issues we return to later. Finally, the DPP has a focus on practices, which we take to be campaigns, 
actions and setting priorities. These are set out in the tables at the end (under the slightly confusing 
Statement of Aims heading) and are mainly organisational or processes to create policies and perspectives. 
For a fledgling organisation, they are grounded and sensible, though with the exception of something on 
Brexit they again lack a sharper politically differentiating thrust. 
 
Past, present, future: towards longer term perspectives. 
What the DPP largely lacks is perspectives, which we take to be underpinning theories or analyses- 
distinctive frameworks for understanding society and guiding strategy. What we’d like to do in the remainder 
of the document is to set out some of the contemporary strategic perspectives on offer and suggest some 
aspects of an alternative. 
The two faces of Corbynism: retro and postmodern 
Whilst the implicit reasons are understandable (concentrate on the consensual, don’t pick fights you can’t 
currently win), it’s still remarkable that DPP says nothing about Corbyn/ism, given that it is the dominant 
and defining perspective shaping Labour and the UK left’s prospects. You can discuss Corbynism in terms 
of (factional) organisation/s and power and how they play out in shaping the Corbyn wing of the party. This 
is important and certainly helps to understand some of the upheavals in Momentum and the tactical 
response that Open Labour will have to consider as those forces start to move in different directions. But 
we are concerned with the underlying strategic perspectives. Here, we distinguish between a traditional 
hard left retro version and the (post)modern, metropolitan postcapitalist variety influenced by Paul Mason 
and others. It is worth noting that both versions have been profoundly affected and reshaped by the 
Brexit/Trump victory and rise of right-wing populism. We will return to that later. 
Retro radicals 
The politics of the core Corbyn group are defined by their long-term oppositionalist trajectory. Their rejection 
of capitalism and the market (including the EU as a ‘capitalist club’) today segues with an anti-austerity 
politics that became popular in the wake of the 2008 crisis and aftermath. The broader worldview is defined 
by an anti-imperialist legacy of the Cold War in which America is always the Great Satan and anyone 
opposing it is to be supported to varying degrees. A third theme is what one of us has described 
as vanguardism – activist-focused politics and organisation that confuses and conflates parties, social 
movements and the wider electorate. 
For a political tendency defined almost solely by what they were against, running a mainstream social 
democratic party has been something of a challenge. Corbyn and McDonnell’s rhetoric and policies have 
significantly softened running the official parliamentary opposition. On economic policy, only full 
nationalisation of the railways really distinguishes it from the standard issue left-Keynesianism of the 
Miliband leadership. Ghosts of the past, however, are still present. As has been clearly demonstrated, their 
historical Euroscepticism weakened the Party’s ‘Remain’ campaign. With little obvious policy difference, 
the defining feature of Corbynism has become the idea of the Party as social movement. However, 
becoming the largest left party in Western Europe co-exists with even lower electoral support than the dark 
days of the early 80s and it is clear that the Labour leadership contest could be the zenith of Corbyn’s 
electoral achievement. 
 
Postcapitalist practitioners 
Prior to Brexit/Trump a head of steam was building up around a ‘21st century socialism’ and what the New 
Statesman has seized on as a new ‘New Times’. For some this was predicated on a postcapitalist, post-
work agenda. In The Guardian in 2015, Paul Mason proclaimed that the ‘end of capitalism had begun’, 
driven by the new information technologies that had reduced the need for work, undermined markets based 
on scarcity and stimulated the spontaneous growth of collaborative production. The headline policies were 
the grand schemes of universal basic income (UBI) and automation. 
These demands issue from a new generation of left intellectuals around the Labour Party, who tend to take 
Corbyn as the present, and potentially disposable, placeholder for a postcapitalist political project. Younger 
and more cosmopolitan than the hard-left Corbynists, this ‘grouping’ tends to dovetail with Mason’s 
delineation of the ‘networked individual’ as the prime mover of contemporary capitalism, a new class agent 
for ‘New Times’. Rather than the workplace, their battlefield is ‘all aspects of society’, the evidence of which 
can be found in city squares and streets across the globe. 
The connections between the cosmopolitans and retro radicals has been of a flirtation than a true marriage 
of ideas, although they share much of the same old-fashioned determinism about how history will unfold. 
The ‘postcapitalist’ agenda is an exemplary case study for how apparently radical ideas seep into the 
mainstream of media and politics, specifically here as a response to the crisis of social democracy as it has 
manifested in the experience of the Labour Party after the fall of New Labour and the ‘third way’. 
This utopian thinking is not without influence on the policy proposals that have emitted from the Labour 
Party under the command of Corbyn and McDonnell. The latter has led the way in entertaining the idea of 
a basic income and advocating the implementation of tech-aided, futuristic ‘Socialism with an iPad’. A 
postcapitalist, post-work project, even setting aside all its flaws, is so disconnected from where society is 
politically that it is even more abstractly utopian than it seems economically. On at least some accounts, 
innovation and productivity are being exhausted, not extended, with politics increasingly the desperate 
struggle over the scant rewards that remain. And even the revolutionary agent of the new society- the 
networked individual- appears to be, judging by the support for Trump and Wilders among millennials, as 
likely a radicalised alt-right white male or a tech-fixated conspiracy theorist than the progressive freelancer 
of the postcapitalist imaginary. A post-work politics is not only empirically inaccurate, but also undermines 
the possibility for a radical agenda about work and class in the here and now. 
This is not about a narrow focus on class politics, but engaging with today’s diverse labour market, labour 
process and household experiences in terms of insecurity, exploitation, excessive performance pressures, 
low wage growth and under-employment. Whilst it is true that traditional struggles and forms of organisation 
have been in decline, pessimism about agency neglects the variety of labour (or labour-related) channels 
and campaigns that are challenging capital, including in the gig economy, and the persistence of exploitative 
relations of one class with another that continue to characterise this work. 
Brand new, you’re retro 
Meanwhile, away from the futurist reveries of its intellectual wing, the retro, hard left part of Corbynism have 
attempted to reclaim something from the right populist surge. Reading Brexit and Trump as expressions of 
class revolt against neoliberalism, the backlash each represent is treated largely as the displacement effect 
of failed economics. On this account, voters gripped by Trump and Brexit, can, be ‘peeled away’ or 
‘captured’ with the right (left) politics. Many supporters of Corbyn have nailed their colours to the ‘economic 
insecurity’ mast as this provides a convenient political rationale for a left-led insurgency argument in which 
radical answers to insecurity and austerity offset or displace social conservatism amongst left behind voters. 
Whilst the economic dimension is a plausible part of the explanatory picture, it underestimates the scale of 
the struggle ahead. The ‘class revolt’ thesis doesn’t really deal with the cultural dimension that crisscrosses 
feelings of being left behind. 
As John Lanchester wrote in the LRB shortly after the EU referendum, ‘People hate to have things taken 
away from them. But whole swathes of the UK have spent the last decades feeling that things are being 
taken away from them: their jobs, their sense that they are heard, their understanding of how the world 
works and their place in it’. A second problem, is that but we are told all the same that Corbynism can be a 
left populist insurgency equivalent to Trump. We saw this in the rapidly unravelled suggestion that Corbyn 
would be relaunched at the outset of 2017 as a rabble-rousing left populist, popping up more often on our 
TV screens to strike fear into the hearts of the ‘establishment’. This is consistent with early claims that 
Corbyn could reach into disenfranchised sections of the electorate, including UKIP supporters. This was 
unlikely then and has proven to be deluded now. Corbyn may be perceived by his supporters as an 
insurgent, but the bulk of the electorate sees him, however unfairly, as a weak leader with out-of-date and 
out-of-touch politics. As for the left behind voters, given the dominance of themes of cultural insecurity, this 
pitch is amongst the least likely to appeal 
Are there any competing strategies from the centre and right of the Party? 
Blue Labour: Class and Nation 
Blue Labour were amongst the first to make an effective critique of New Labour’s abandonment of working 
class communities, cultures and interests, as well as a critique of  globalisation  and commodification of 
more areas of social life. Its leaders have a perceptive take on the Party’s demise and the need to rebuild 
the ‘labour interest’. It is with their strategic solutions that we take issue. While there is a case for framing 
aspects of policy in terms of ‘progressive patriotism’ (or something like it), the appeal to ‘faith, flag and 
family’ is not only discordant with the left’s core urban support base, but with much of contemporary social 
life. 
Where Corbynism seeks to resolve the messy business of the class contradiction in the people or the 
multitude, Blue Labour proposes to resolve it in the nation. The nation state is, of course an appropriate 
site of policy and practice. However, the nation plays a different and more dangerous game, subject to 
pathologies as projects framed solely or largely in terms of national renewal confront the necessarily world-
scale of market relations and the international nature of the division of labour. Interestingly, on the terrain 
of the national, Blue Labour and Corbynism have more in common – around dreams of a prioritisation of 
national sovereignty – than either would care to admit. There is also a common antipathy to the ‘capitalist’ 
European project- as if capital is something that operates from outside upon the nation-state rather than 
through it. 
Even on Blue Labour’s stronger terrain of class identity, class is too often seen as an accumulation of 
cultural associations, with the working class specifically as the custodian of a common culture. This 
undercuts the continuing conflicts of interest at the heart of contemporary capitalism. Talking about class 
without this antagonism allows an identification of the nation with these ‘lost’ cultural associations rather 
than a new radical project that seeks to recapture powers from capital, in part through pooled sovereignty. 
We return to this theme later. 
Progress: (No) Progress 
Where the Progress wing of the party is concerned, there is seldom more to say than ‘back to the future’, 
before Corbyn came along. It is doubtful it is whether the centre and right of the Party has a perspectives-
led strategy. There is plenty of talk, but it is more in anguish than analysis. In a recent article the Deputy 
Editor of Progress, Conor Pope, argued that moderates must ‘own the past’ to challenge Corbyn, indicating 
that such forces still see the experience of New Labour as the focal point of its politics. This is not a good 
idea for though there many policies to be proud of, strategically New Labour was a complete failure in terms 
of a sustainable social democratic project. 
Longer versions are available, but the short version is as follows. Once Blair dumped his flirtation with 
stakeholding and the ‘third way’, he fully embraced the positive view of globalisation and the triumph of 
markets articulated by his main political guru Anthony Giddens. 
There is a remarkable debate between Giddens and Will Hutton at the start of a 2001 book On the Edge: 
Living with Global Capitalism in which the latter lays out all the continuities and negative consequences of 
the kind of casino capitalism that were already evident and turned out to be horribly accurate. Giddens 
considered any problems to be only ‘pathologies at the edge’ and ‘excesses’. 
What the interchange reinforces is the extent to which an optimistic narrative of contemporary capitalism 
was underpinned by ideas of the knowledge or weightless economy.  This so-called new economic 
paradigm (sold to Blair by Leadbetter, Mulgan and other remnants of the Marxism Today project) was led 
by financial markets, would drive globalisation and growth, and create an army of creative, well-paid and 
‘wired’ workers. The economy could be left to itself, with the state only doing the supply-side stuff, ensuring 
the skills (de)regulating the labour markets. Production and the working class, on this rationale, were last 
century’s issues. 
When Iraq destroyed Blair, the same narrative was continued by Gordon Brown, with his ill-fated boast of 
no more boom and bust. Except this time this reading of globalisation, finance and the knowledge economy 
functioned as a genuine, if flawed, social democratic strategy. Financial markets would be left alone (or 
further deregulated) in return for using the proceeds of growth to fund public services and labour market 
subsidies (e.g. tax credits). The 2008 GFC destroyed that strategy, revealing the chimera of the knowledge-
based economy and the instability of a financialised capitalism. 
Although Brown and Obama helped rescue banks and the capital markets from their own irrational 
exuberance, Labour ultimately got the blame rather than the credit.  Recession and austerity combined with 
neo-liberal forms of globalisation to deepen inequality and insecurity. The new Miliband leadership flirted 
with some radical ideas and policies, but lost the narrative wars on austerity, debt and spending and 
disappeared in a limp ‘narrow retail offer’ at the last and lost 2015 general election. 
The need for an interventionist industrial strategy – words that were unsayable in the New Labour years 
– reappeared as part of Theresa May’s strategic reorientation of the Tories. This is the past that Progress 
and the centre-right want to compete with retro Corbynism – in their different ways – to own. The former 
are going nowhere politically and the latter can only deflect from their own shambolic leadership by saying 
that it all started turning to shit under New Labour. This is true, but as Labour pollster James Morris put it 
recently, ‘Corbyn inherited a brand that had been steadily alienating its working class base, and he made 
it worse’. 
 
Towards a transformative political agenda 
Our arguments are suffused by what we call a radical pessimism. If there is pessimism amongst the 
perspectives we have discussed, it is preoccupied with questions of agency – Labour is dead, social 
democracy is obsolete, Labour’s polling numbers are plummeting. While it would be difficult to concerns 
about the latter, our pessimism is defined by the object of action rather than the agent. In contrast to the 
overlapping optimistic narratives of postcapitalism and the knowledge economy, capitalism is not 
disappearing or even diminishing in its impacts on economy and society. Rhetoric about the sharing 
economy and collaborative networks is mostly just that. Optimistic narratives about capitalism diminish and 
deflect the tasks of forging a realistic, radical, transformative agenda. It is not social democracy that is 
obsolete, but its existing perspectives. The twin pressures of neoliberal forms of globalisation and a 
financialised economy (and economic elites) have hollowed out democratic governance, not just the feeble 
responses of social democratic parties. The new strands of techno-utopian ‘21st century socialism’ have a 
big-picture analysis of this complex of factors, but it is often wrong about the trajectory of capitalism and 
too optimistic by far. 
Contrary to the notion that history will unfold in our favour, renewing a radical social democratic project will 
not be easy. The days of ‘retail offers’ to the electorate are or should be over. Something more potent is 
needed that connects at the emotional level where national populism currently dominates. This task seems 
a long way from the rival visions and versions of a ‘21st century socialism’. As Owen Jones suggests, it 
requires some kind of popular (but not ‘populist’) politics capable of connecting with working-class and other 
communities on the ground. There is a large core of racist and social conservative voters who the left is 
highly unlikely to reach and whose views need challenging. For other voters sympathetic to national 
populism, the layering of identities and perceived interests are more fluid. Some working class ‘left behind’ 
voters will be open to a radical project, if their economic fears and cultural identities are understood and 
addressed. 
A useful starting point, shared amongst a growing number of left commentators is to construct part of an 
alternative around a different version of the Leave slogan of ‘taking back control’. As Tom Crewe notes in 
an excellent recent overview of the ‘Strange Death of Municipal England’ for the LRB, the ‘fantasies of 
control’ around which the Leave campaign circulated were uprooted from reality precisely because of their 
captivation of voters ‘unused to power and reckless with responsibility’. A sense of popular investment in 
or ownership of the world around them had ceded with the death of municipalism at the hands of centralised 
governments more keen on the outsourcing and privatisation of, say, water, energy, leisure and libraries 
than their local democratic control. At present, the left has little to say about control. It talks of robots, and 
not who owns them. Free money, and not who issues it. The arc of history, we hear, tends towards a 
technological and social unfolding that delivers utopia on a plate, without struggle. 
Radicalising the demand to ‘take back control’ could help bridge the distance between where the left is 
currently at and where it needs to be. Technicolour dreams can follow. 
Any systematic strategy to take back and wield control would need to address economic insecurity and the 
stagnant productivity that limits growth in incomes and innovation. This is not just about what the state can 
do to redress market failure – the classic left-Keynesian policies of state investment in infrastructure and 
skills – but controls over what capital does. Some sovereignty has to be clawed back from capital, setting 
limits on what corporations do with respect to contracts (regulate the gig economy), taxes (act against tax 
evasion) and takeovers (strengthen anti-monopoly measures). Financialisation of the economy is the prime 
driver of the power and hyper-mobility of capital. A policy agenda of de-financialisation, framed as a radical 
re-balancing of the economy, would provide incentives for productive, green(er) and sustainable, 
innovation-led growth; whilst including penalties for the predatory and speculative; and shift power towards 
workers, consumers and other non-corporate stakeholders. Admittedly, Brexit has made this harder as 
some of these measures would be more effective if sovereignty was pooled, but it would nevertheless 
constitute a powerful alternative to the sham that is Tory ‘industrial strategy’. 
A left version of TBC would have to explicitly challenge ascendant national populism, north and south of 
the border. That has to include a clearer position on sovereignty, so that we can argue for more control 
over some things and shared sovereignty on others (international cooperation climate change, defense 
security etc). ‘Sovereignty’, for all it is bandied around at present, is a largely abstract concept, subject to 
the dewy-eyed romanticism of John Bull patriots. The ‘control’ auspiciously desired by Leave voters is 
certainly not possible on the terrain of national sovereignty around which they stake their claim – indeed, 
its pursuit is so dangerous precisely because of its insatiability as a demand. Sovereignty, as The 
Economist’s Bagehot columnist, Jeremy Cliffe, has noted, is pooled and not preserved. It is not a zero-sum 
game. Global challenges cross borders, and our ‘sovereignty’ is stronger for the capacity to face them 
together with other states. Moreover, short of full protectionism or autarky, national sovereignty is 
impossible in a world where legal frameworks and standards of measurement follow the path of trade, 
establishing equivalent grounds for commodity exchange. To address the desire for control, we should also 
look closer to home. 
A new TBC agenda would require a major push towards pluralist, decentralised forms of governance. There 
is a welcome wind behind a new, federal settlement for the UK that matches the expanded voices focused 
on the devolved assemblies. As we indicated earlier, we are deeply sceptical of the idea of a progressive 
alliance that is based on electoral pacts that would be perceived by many as another elite, choice-reducing 
fix. But we are wholly in favour of greater cooperation around key policies, notably voting reform for the UK 
parliament and local elections. It is notable that many voters who feel left out used their Brexit vote in order 
to make a difference. Whilst it was not the kind of difference that most of us wanted, it gives some indication 
of how existing choices and outcomes under first-past-the-post feed cynicism and disengagement. 
Such a decentralising agenda would in any case be consistent with a renewed emphasis on bottom-up 
initiatives. This new democracy needs to be rooted in practical and concrete relationships that channel 
political sentiment in a deliberative way. TBC can start locally, for example using the deleterious cutbacks 
enforced on city halls to create space for localised grassroots alternatives to step in and ‘co-produce’ on a 
municipal level that which councils formerly delivered. . A radical TBC agenda is only part of existing and 
future left perspectives. But, there’s no point in willing the world to change if it is beyond our control. We 
should work at seizing the latter instead of waiting idly by for the former to unfold. 
 
 
